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This paper reviews five striking facts about inequality across countries.  As Kuznets (1955) famously
first documented, inequality first rises and then falls with income.  More unequal societies are much
less likely to have democracies or governments that respect property rights.  Unequal societies have
less redistribution, and we have little idea whether this relationship is caused by redistribution
reducing inequality or inequality reducing redistribution.  Inequality and ethnic heterogeneity are
highly correlated, either because of differences in educational heritages across ethnicities or because
ethnic  heterogeneity  reduces  redistribution.    Finally,  there  is  much  more  inequality  and  less









1.  Introduction 
 
The insight that economics impacts politics as much as politics impacts economics lies at 
the heart of political economy.  This circle of causation is at the center of research on the 
political economy of inequality.  Democracy, political stability and executive constraints 
all appear to be more feasible in more equal societies.  Public policies towards 
redistribution and human capital can make societies more equal.   
 
In Section II of this paper, I review the causes of inequality.  Recent increases in 
inequality in the developed world are in part the result of skill-biased technological 
change (Katz and Murphy, 1992), but government policies influence how these 
technological changes impact different developed countries (Hanratty and Blank, 1992).     
Long-standing differences in inequality across countries may reflect colonialism and 
patterns of agriculture, but initial differences in inequality also influenced political 
institutions, policies, and structures, which may have exacerbated economic inequality 
(as in Moore, 1966, Engerman and Sokoloff, 2002).   
 
In Section III of this paper, I review the second half of the causal chain between 
inequality and politics— the impact of inequality on government.  In medial voter 
models, inequality predicts more redistribution.  However, greater inequality can mean 
that the wealthy have more resources which can be used to reduce influence.   Great gaps 
between rich and poor may also hurt democracy and rule of law if elites prefer dictators 
who will protect their interests or if the disadvantaged turn to a dictator who promises to 
ignore property rights.   
 
In the last section of this review essay, I turn to the special question of “American 
Exceptionalism,” which in this context refers to the question of why there is so much less 
redistribution and more inequality in the U.S. than in Europe.  The differences between 
the U.S. and Europe in inequality and redistribution have troubled authors like Friedrich   3
Engels, Werner Sombart and Martin Lipset for more than a century.  American 
exceptionalism appears to be the result of ethnic heterogeneity and European political 
institutions, which have been influenced by numerous revolutions and two World Wars.  
A large body of evidence supports the hypothesis that ethnic heterogeneity reduces 
support for welfare, and the U.S. is far more ethnically heterogeneous than Europe.  The 
U.S. also has political institutions including a majoritarian government, federalism, and 
checks and balances which have limited the expansion of the American welfare state, 
while European countries lack comparable institutions.  These institutional differences 
are not exogenous, but rather reflect the fact that many European constitutions were 
rewritten by left wing politicians when earlier monarchies were defeated militarily. 
 
2.  The Political and Economic Causes of Inequality 
 
Most studies of inequality focus of income, but inequality can also be calculated based on 
wealth, consumption or any other reasonable proxy for well-being.    Wealth or 
consumption have the advantage that they are less subject to short term income shocks, 
and the inequality of lifetime earnings is probably more important than the inequality of 
transitory earnings.  However, because wealth and consumption data are not available in 
enough circumstances, most of the empirical work focuses on inequality of annual 
income.  Consequently, I focus my empirical discussion on that variable.  Nevertheless, 
improving inequality measures by improving the measurement of permanent well-being 
is certainly one research frontier.   
 
Measuring income inequality also requires transforming the distribution of income or 
wealth or consumption into a single measure that can be used in standard empirical work.  
The literature on this issue parallels the industrial organization literature on market 
concentration.  The most popular measure of income inequality is the Gini coefficient 
which is the difference between the 45 degree line and the Lorenz curve that shows the 
cumulative distribution of income.  A second measure is the share of total national 
income possessed by various subgroups of the population, i.e. the share of total wealth 
owned by the richest 5 percent of the population.  In some cases, these variables will   4
actually reveal much more than a Gini coefficient, especially if we are interested in 
knowing whether inequality matters because the rich are particularly rich or because the 
poor are particularly poor.   As different measures are usually highly correlated, different 
empirical studies that use these different measures often produce quite similar results 
(e.g. compare Persson and Tabellini, 1994, with Alesina and Rodrik, 1994).   
 
Inequality over Time 
 
These empirical measures are then used by empirical researchers, who have provided a 
series of facts about the correlates of inequality.  Perhaps the most famous relationship is 
the Kuznets (1955) curve shown in Figure 1.  Income inequality first rises and then falls 
as countries get richer.  This curve points to the initial period of industrialization as the 
point of development where inequality is maximized.  Indeed, U.S. history shows a 
“great compression” during the middle decades of the 20
th century (Goldin and Margo, 
1992) as the relatively equal period between 1950-1975 followed the far greater 
inequality of the Gilded age and pre-depression America.  Figure 1 also illustrates 
American exceptionalism as the U.S. is much more unequal than other countries of 
comparable income.   
 
The Kuznets curve is not just an economic phenomenon; it also reflects political factors.  
The general pattern in industrializing nations is that there are few public efforts to 
redistribute during early industrialization.  During this period, traditional private 
providers of charity (churches, charities, families) are expected to look after the bottom 
end of the income distribution.  As industrialization proceeds, governments almost 
universally started taking a more active role in redistribution, which is one reason why 
inequality declines with development.   Development increases redistribution for at least 
three reasons: development is generally associated with greater government size, 
probably due to increasing governmental competence; development is associated with 
greater education and political skill on the part of poorer citizens, and development 
transforms a dispersed agrarian workforce into clustered industrial workers who can 
readily be organized.     5
 
Somewhat surprisingly, given the Kuznets curve, the great compression was followed 
within the United States, and elsewhere, by a significant increase in inequality since 
1975.  Katz and Murphy (1992) conclude that the period of rising inequality in the U.S. 
appears to be have been driven by rising demand for more skilled workers.  The rise in 
demand for the skilled might be the result of a number of different changes including 
skill-biased technological change, increasing trade and globalization, the decline of 
manufacturing, and unions.  Pride of place appears now to be given to changing 
technology (Autor, Katz and Krueger, 1998) as the cause of greater inequality, but other 
factors also matter. 
 
While most authors seem to believe that rising inequality within the U.S. is the result of 
economic as opposed to political changes, the impact of these economic changes is 
determined in part by a political filter.  Technological changes and increases in world 
trade should impact most developed countries in similar ways.  Yet the U.S. has 
experienced a much more striking increase in inequality than most other comparable 
countries (Picketty and Saez, 2003, Blau and Kahn, 1996, Hanratty and Blank, 1992), and 
economic forces alone do not appear to explain why inequality rose so much more within 
the U.S. 
 
Political factors surely played some role in the greater increase in inequality with the U.S. 
At the top of the income distribution, less progressive taxation in the U.S. made it easier 
for Americans to become rich and increased the incentives for Americans to acquire large 
fortunes (Picketty and Saez, 2003).  Stronger unions and centralized bargaining in Europe 
increased equality there among industrial and other middle income workers (Blau and 
Kahn, 1996).  Unions have generally fought inequality among their members, perhaps 
because heterogeneity breaks down union cohesion or because of the quasi-democratic 
nature of most unions.  At the bottom of the income distribution, general unemployment 
benefits and restrictive labor market regulations ensure that more of the less productive 
European workers leave the workforce and are therefore excluded from measures of wage 
inequality.     6
 
Inequality across Countries 
 
If changes in inequality within the U.S. and other countries are primarily the result of 
changing returns to skills and government responses to those changing returns to skill, 
differences in inequality across countries are more often caused by differences in the 
distribution of skills.  In particularly egalitarian countries, like in Scandinavia, the 
population is generally well educated and the distribution of skills is quite compact.  
Conversely, particularly unequal developing countries like Brazil have enormously 
heterogeneous skill levels between educated urban elites and less educated agricultural 
workers.     
 
But if the inequality of skills underlies the inequality of income, then the primary puzzle 
becomes understanding why skill inequalities are so different across country.  Skill levels 
today are themselves result both of government policies, and long-standing cultural 
forces, like religion or ethnicity, but patterns of national inequality appear to predate the 
era of large-scale government schooling (the 19
th century).  As high levels of inequality 
often predate significant government redistribution or schooling, cultural, and religious 
causes are probably the first causes of inequality across countries.   
 
Protestant churches sought legitimacy in the Bible (as opposed to the traditions of the 
Catholic church) and these churches encouraged literacy to increase familiarity with the 
Bible (Weber, 2001).  Protestant communities worked to create widespread education 
that would ensure that everyone could read, which increased both the level of education 
and decreased its variance by raising the lower tail of the distribution.    
 
More importantly, skill inequality seems to come mostly from the juxtaposition of 
ethnicities with different educational traditions, and in particular the extent to which new 
world countries are made up primarily of Europeans or of mixtures of Europeans and 
non-Europeans.  As Figure 2 shows, the correlation between ethnic fractionalization and 
income inequality is quite strong.  Europeans who came to the New World had a   7
significant educational advantage over the natives they conquered, at least in terms of 
skills that became valuable in developed economies.  Even the great empires of the pre-
Columbian Americas lacked basic modern skills; the Incas had no alphabet.   
 
Inequality then depends significantly on the extent to which nations are populated by 
Europeans or mixtures of Europeans and natives.  Engerman and Sokoloff (2003) argue 
that countries with a comparative advantage in cash crops, such as sugar or tobacco, 
attracted small numbers of Europeans who then relied on local and slave labor to farm 
these crops.  Those countries are less equal to this day.  Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2001) argue that settler mortality determined whether countries attracted large 
European migrations (which then largely eradicated the existing native populations) or 
smaller scale migrations that then interacted with native and slave labor.  Galor, Moav 
and Vollarth (2004) present a more general theory of land distribution and long run 
inequality.    
  
If populations with heterogenous educational backgrounds are the initial condition 
determining modern inequality, the actual distribution of income today also depends on a 
large number of government policies towards schooling and redistribution since that 
point.  Many Asian countries, which once had small European elites and large masses of 
uneducated natives, are now both well educated and egalitarian.  These transformations 
reflect the results of government policies towards education in countries like Singapore, 
Taiwan, and South Korea.  By contrast, initial skill differences in countries in ethnically 
heterogeneous countries were often widened, not eliminated, by subsequent educational 
policies which favored the European elites. 
 
Figure 3 shows the strong negative correlation between inequality and social welfare 
spending across countries.  This correlation reflects both that social welfare reduces 
inequality and more initial inequality leads to less redistribution.  While some of this 
relationship reflects reverse causality, and omitted variables (like income and 
fractionalization) that drive both variables, there is little doubt that governments do have   8
the power through tax policy and through spending to alter the income distribution of 
their country.   
 
Understanding income inequality across countries also requires understanding the reasons 
that a government decides to invest in its children, or to invest in redistribution more 
generally.  Two factors, apart from inequality itself, appear to be important: ethnic 
heterogeneity, and political institutions.  Ethnic and racial fractionalization limits the 
tendency to redistribute income either because people are less willing to support transfers 
to those who are ethnically different, or because ethnic differences provide a means of 
demonizing policies that help the poor (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004).  Individual data on 
opinion polls and voting behavior, cross-state outcomes within the U.S., cross-national 
data, and history all support the view that ethnic heterogeneity reduces redistribution.  
Luttmer (2001) shows that people are more likely to support redistribution when they live 
around poor people of the same race and less likely to support redistribution when they 
live around poor people of a different race.  Holding income constant, there is also a huge 
impact of race on the willingness to support redistribution and vote democratic, 
suggesting the significance of race in politics. 
 
Across states within the U.S., the percentage of the population that is black strongly 
predicts less generous welfare systems and across countries, ethnic fractionalization 
strongly predicts less redistribution; across countries, redistribution also declines with 
ethnic heterogeneity (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004).  The history of redistribution within the 
U.S. points to the importance that race has played at several critical junctures, such as the 
fight against the Populists in the 1890s (see Woodward, 1955).  
 
Political institutions, like proportional representation and majoritarianism, also impact the 
level of redistribution (Persson and Tabellini, 2003, Miles-Feretti, Perotti and Rostagno, 
2002).  This literature suggests that majoritarianism induces governments to cater to the 
needs of the median voter, while proportional representation ensures the election of 
representative who may be particularly focused on the desires of the poor for more 
transfers.  Likewise, federalism limits redistribution because out-migration of capital and   9
the wealthy serves as a break on the tendency to redistribute income (Qian and Weingast, 
1997), except if the government actually wants the rich to flee because the rich represent 
its electoral opponents (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2004).  Checks and balances are another 
force that has tended to restrict the growth of welfare states.   
 
While there is little doubt that political institutions do matter for the level of 
redistribution in society, the greater question is whether these institutions should be taken 
as first causes or as endogenous factors that reflect deeper social forces (Glaeser, 
LaPorta, Lopes-De-Silanes and Shleifer, 2004).  Political institutions are hardly all that 
permanent.  France acquired proportional representation in 1946, with the Fourth 
Republic, lost it after the failed right wing coup that ended that government and put 
DeGaulle in power, re-acquired it under Mitterand and then lost it when the socialists 
realized that proportional representation was helping right-wing extremists.  The relative 
stability of Anglo-American traditions has often led scholars to vastly overstate the 
degree to which political institutions are durable.  I will turn to the causes of institutional 
change in Section IV when I compare the U.S. and Europe.  
 
3.  The Impact of Inequality on Politics 
 
There are three different ways in which inequality might impact political outcomes.  
First, rising inequality should impact inequality even within a median voter framework, 
where rising inequality leads to a greater desire for redistribution.  Second, higher 
inequality might reduce redistribution and public good provision because economic 
resources determine not only preferences, but the ability to influence political outcomes 
as well.  Third, economic inequality might influence the whole structure of political 
institutions (like democracy) themselves.  
 
The most straightforward prediction of the median voter literature (summarized by 
Londregan in this volume) is that redistribution will be popular when the mean income is 
higher than the median income (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). If income follows a Pareto 
distribution, then an increase in variance will be associated with an increase in the gap   10
between mean and median income.  Two of the more influential papers that examine 
inequality within a median voter context are Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina 
and Rodrik (1994), which both argue that greater inequality will lead to greater 
preferences for redistribution, and show a negative empirical connection between 
inequality and growth.     
 
The open question with these papers is whether inequality actually increases 
redistribution.  As shown in Figure 3, empirically there is a strong negative relationship 
between inequality and social welfare spending, which seems to contradict this claim.  
While this negative correlation might reflect that more redistribution reduces inequality, 
it is also possible that more inequality leads to less redistribution rather than more 
because in unequal societies the poor lack the resources to push their political agenda.    
 
The median voter model also can explain a connection between inequality and public 
good provision.   Greater inequality should work like any form of heterogeneity and 
decrease the demand for common public goods (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999).  For 
example, the rich might want a legal system focused on protecting property while the 
poor might be more concerned with preventing interpersonal violence in disadvantaged 
areas.  Because these groups disagree, there is less willingness to invest in a common 
legal system than there would be if the population shared a common set of legal needs.   
 
This is certainly one interpretation of the finding that crime is higher in more unequal 
societies (Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza, 2002).  One natural interpretation of this 
connection might be that as inequality rises, the returns to crime increase for the poor 
(because rich victims because richer) and the opportunity costs of crime are lower 
(because the poor are poorer).  Another interpretation is that more unequal societies have 
less policing, which does appear to be the case.  For example, there are 12,000 police 
officers in Bogota, Columbia, and 28,000 police officers in New York City.  These two 
cities have similar populations, but Columbia is a particularly unequal nation.       
   11
While the most cited papers on inequality and policy outcomes have focused on results 
within a median voter context, inequality of resources will also change the political clout 
of different groups.  Indeed, the most important impact of inequality may be changing the 
power with which the rich and poor can impact outcomes.  For example, if the rich can 
influence political outcomes through lobbying activities or membership in special interest 
groups (Prat in this volume discusses the influence of pressure groups), then more 
inequality could lead to less redistribution rather than more. This negative correlation can 
be seen in Figure 3.  According to this view, as the rich become richer, they acquire a 
greater ability to influence policy and achieve the policy goals that they want.   
 
Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer (2003) provide one connecting inequality of resources 
with the ability to manipulate political institutions.  This model focuses on bribing 
judges.  It suggests that when the judicial system is sufficiently weak, so that the 
expected penalty facing a judge who accepts a bribe is small, then the ability to bribe will 
determine the outcome in court.  This work emphasizes the subversion of legal and 
political processes and argues that this subversion will be more likely in societies where 
different actors have unequal access to the resources needed for subversion.   Inequality 
may lead courts to break down or, as in the Engerman and Sokoloff examples, rich 
magnates may use their economic power to make a mockery of popular democracy.    
 
These arguments are related to a third literature on the connection between inequality and 
political outcomes which emphasizes that inequality will lead to different political 
institutions, and in some cases less democracy (the Przeworski chapter in this volume 
discusses the determinants of democracy).  Indeed, stable democracy is much more 
common in highly equal societies.  Dividing the world into more and less equal countries 
based on World Bank Gini coefficients shows that 95 percent of the more equal countries 
are classified as democracies by Jaggers and Marshall (2000) and only 75 percent of the 
less equal societies are classified as democracies.   
 
While the correlation between inequality and democracy might be the result of reverse 
causality where democracy reduces inequality, Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) provide   12
compelling historical evidence showing that initial inequality seems to deter the 
development of democracy in the new world.   Inequality, which was itself the result of 
long-run economic factors, led many seemingly progressive groups to oppose extending 
the franchise.  Educated urban workers feared extending the franchise in many cases 
because this would empower rural magnates who would totally control the votes of their 
poor employees.   
 
There are many models that predict a causal link between equality and democracy.  It 
may be that in less equal countries, elites are less willing to share power with the poor 
because of fear of expropriation.  Alternatively, potential enemies of democracy may find 
it easy to build support among the poor.  While there is a great deal of history providing 
support for both phenomena (Finer, 1962), little empirical work exists to assess the 
relative importance of the different stories. 
 
Inequality is not only correlated with dictatorship, but also with other measures of 
political problems.  For example, Figure 4 shows that inequality is positively correlated 
with subjective assessments of the risk of governments expropriating private wealth.  
Most similar measures of property rights protection show a negative correlation with 
inequality.  You and Khagram (2004) indeed find a connection between inequality and 
corruption.    Again, causal inference is impossible but these correlations are strong and 
suggestive and they at least raise the possibility that inequality may be causing bad 
government.   
   
4.  American Exceptionalism 
 
Few topics in the political economy of inequality have as rich a heritage as the study of 
American exceptionalism— why the U.S. is less equal than Europe and why the U.S. 
never developed a full fledged European welfare state. Although DeToqueville (1835) is 
rightly seen as the first scholar of American exceptionalism, the modern literature really 
begins with Friedrich Engels (1959) and Werner Sombart (1976) who asked “why is 
there no socialism in the United States.”   Seymour Martin Lipset (1966) continued this   13
tradition and became the expert in understanding why socialism never flourished within 
the U.S.   
 
Economic, political, and sociological factors could all potentially explain American 
exceptionalism.  The economic explanations focus on the allegedly higher levels of 
economic opportunity within the U.S.  Americans do believe that they live in an open 
society, and Europeans believe that they live in a closed society.  After all, only 29 
percent of Americans surveyed believe that the poor are trapped in poverty while 60 
percent of Europeans believe that the poor are trapped.  60 percent of Americans believe 
that the poor are lazy, while only 26 percent of Europeans share that belief (Alesina and 
Glaeser, 2004).   
 
But there is little reality behind those views.  Gottschalk and Spolaore (2002) look at 
income mobility in the U.S. and Germany and find that 60 percent of the members of the 
bottom quintile of the income distribution in the U.S. in 1984 remained in that quintile in 
1993, while only 46 percent of Germans in the bottom quintile of their income 
distribution remained in that bottom quintile 9 years later.  Checchi, Ichino and 
Rustichini (1999) find similar results when comparing intergenerational mobility in the 
U.S. and Europe.  Alesina and Glaeser (2004) survey a wide range of evidence and find 
little evidence supporting economic explanations for American exceptionalism.   In the 
next section, I will discuss why views about economic mobility differ so much between 
the U.S. and Europe when reality doesn’t look all that different.  
 
Standard median voter theory provides little ability to explain the differences between the 
U.S. and Europe.  The U.S. income distribution is more variable and skewed to the right 
than the European income distribution.  In a standard median voter model, both of these 
factors predict that there should be more redistribution in the U.S., not less.   There is no 
evidence that the U.S. tax system is more inefficient than European tax systems.  
Privately, Americans are much more generous than their European counterparts, so it is 
hard to believe that the lack of an American welfare system just reflects some lack of 
American generosity.     14
 
Two factors appear to explain America’s low level of redistribution and greater level of 
inequality: ethnic heterogeneity and political institutions.  As I discussed above, ethnic 
fractionalization appears to be strongly correlated with low levels of redistribution across 
countries, and America is far more ethnically heterogeneous than Europe.  European 
countries are remarkably homogenous, either because nations engaged in strong 
homogenizing policies or because current nations reflect ethnically homogenous areas 
that broke away from former empires.   America is a nation of immigrants and kidnapped 
slaves, and there has never been a policy of homogenization comparable to that followed 
in France, for example, in the late 19
th century.   
 
The importance of ethnic fractionalization is not only seen in cross-national regressions.   
As mentioned above, there is a significant correlation between the percentage of the 
population that is black in a state and less generous welfare payments.  Opinion polls 
within the U.S. also confirm the role of race in attitudes towards redistribution.  Perhaps 
most convincingly, there is abundant historical evidence showing the role that racial 
divisions have played in stemming the rise of the American left.  The New York City 
Draft riot, which was America’s bloodiest riot and labor uprising, petered out in part 
because the German rioters turned on the Irish.  In the 1870s and 1880s, conflicts 
between natives and immigrants bedeviled the labor movement.  In the 1890s, Southern 
conservatives used racism to discredit their populist opponents whose policies would 
have enriched poor blacks.  In 1928, anti-Catholicism was used against Democrat Al 
Smith in the 1928 election.  In the 1960s, the powerful Democratic political coalition fell 
apart over issues of race and civil rights in the South.  Racial divisions do not 
automatically breed dislike, but they do make it possible for political entrepreneurs to 
build distrust and even hatred.   
 
Using the coefficient from an international regression where redistribution is regressed on 
ethnic heterogeneity and other controls, the differences in ethnic heterogeneity between 
the U.S. and Europe can explain one-half of the difference in redistribution between these 
two regions.  Of course, the view that America’s ethnic fractionalization explains the lack   15
of redistribution is not new.  Friedrich Engels himself emphasized the divisions between 
natives, immigrants and blacks as a reason why America didn’t have a socialist party. 
 
But racial heterogeneity is not the only reason for American exceptionalism.  There are a 
number of differences in political institutions between the U.S. and Europe that also help 
explain the smaller U.S. welfare state.  As discussed earlier, there is a strong link across 
developed countries between proportional representation and the level of redistribution. 
This link shouldn’t surprise any student of European history—in the early 20
th century, 
workers’ parties regularly lobbied for the introduction of proportional representation 
because they thought that this would strengthen their electoral chances.  Using the 
coefficient on proportional representation from cross-country regressions, the difference 
in this one institution between the U.S. and Europe can explain the smaller U.S. social 
welfare state (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004).   
 
The strong relationship between proportional representation and redistribution across 
countries reflects more than just a causal effect of this one institution.  Proportional 
representation tends to accompany a wide range of institutions which together supported 
the rise of the welfare state in Europe, and American majoritarianism is accompanied by 
many other political institutions which have helped stem the growth American 
redistribution.  For example, U.S. traditions of federalism which gave power of welfare to 
the States seem to have checked the rise of welfare spending as states limit redistribution 
to keep rich people in and poor people out.  Checks and balances within the U.S., which 
are often weaker in many European countries, also appear to check the growth of 
redistribution.  In the 1930s, the conservative bloc in the Senate (combining Southern 
Democrats and Northern Republicans) blocked the continuing expansion of the New 
Deal.  In the 1990s, the interactions between Gingrich’s house and Clinton’s presidency 
ended “welfare as we know it.” 
 
America also has institutions that are not particularly democratic and that represent past 
political views more than current popular enthusiasms.  Both the Senate and the Supreme 
Court have at various times presented serious roadblocks to the growth of the American   16
welfare state, particularly in the 1930s, but also in the 19
th century when the Supreme 
Court repeatedly declared that the income tax was unconstitutional.  In the late 20
th 
century, conservative railed against a liberal activist court, but prior to 1950, the Supreme 
Court was a steady break on the growth of government regulation, taxation and 
redistribution.   
   
While there seems little doubt that American political institutions help us to understand 
why the U.S. has much less redistribution and more inequality, these institutions are 
themselves hardly the root causes of the differences across the Atlantic.  Institutions are 
rarely the first causes of anything, but rather just reflect more exogenous differences 
between countries.  A comparison of European and American political institutions in 
1870 would surely tell us that the U.S. has the most liberal, not the most conservative, 
institutions among wealthier countries.  The United States had widespread suffrage and 
gave more power to popular democracies than most European nations.  France had an 
Emperor, Prussia its King and even England had a powerful entrenched House of Lords.  
In the 19
th century, the U.S. had institutions that were particularly progressive, not 
particularly conservative. 
 
The big difference in political institutions between the U.S. and Europe is the result of 
radical change of political institutions in 19
th century Europe and the relative stability of 
the U.S.  Almost every major country in continental Europe had either a full-fledged 
revolution (as in Germany, Austria, Portugal, Russia), a general strike whose impact was 
quasi-revolutionary (as in Belgium, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland), a civil war (Spain), 
or a post-war constitutional revision that completely revamped pre-existing institutions 
(France, Italy).  Some European countries had more than one of these events. 
 
In small, dense countries, these violent uprisings succeeded in forcing institutional chane 
even without externally produced chaos.  Belgium, Finland and Portugal all revamped 
their institutions (and established proportional representation) before the First World 
War.  In larger countries, big armies made up of soldiers who were socially isolated from 
strikers or revolutionaries served to repress domestic uprisings before 1914.  The real   17
watershed was the First World War, when ancient dynasties were first defeated in battle 
and then upended by domestic uprisings.  Demoralized armies that were made up of 
civilian draftees rather than professional soldiers were unwilling or unable to suppress 
revolution or strikers in Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Italy.  As left 
wing groups gained control at the expense of defeated dynasties, they crafted political 
institutions that would entrench left-wing power for decades to come.  The European 
welfare state is, in many cases, built on political institutions which are the legacy of the 
chaos and defeats of 1918. 
 
The U.S. then is exceptional, not because it lacked violent strikers or because it lacked a 
labor movement, but rather because these groups were unable to force change in the 
American constitution through strikes or revolutions.  In the late 19
th century, in the New 
York City Draft riots, in the Homestead strike, and in the Haymarket riots, police and 
Pinkertons successfully stopped uprisings.  Moreover, because of America’s vast size, 
these uprisings happened far from the corridors of power, so they did not really threaten 
America’s political leadership.  In the 20
th century, when the Bonus marchers moved on 
Washington, the undefeated, professional America easily dispersed these straggling 
veterans with force.  America kept its 18
th century constitution, with its strong respect for 
property rights, because the country did not lose a war on its home soil and the forces of 
the government were always easily up to the task of repressing left-wing uprisings.  In 
Europe, political institutions reflect the chaos of 20
th century Europe and the power of 
socialist forces during that chaos.      
 
Beliefs about Inequality 
 
This discussion still leaves one final puzzle: why do Americans and European have such 
different beliefs about the nature of inequality in their countries.  Why do sixty percent of 
Americans believe that their poor are lazy and have tremendous opportunities, while sixty 
percent of Europeans believe that the poor are trapped?  There is no evidence suggesting 
that the American poor work less hard than their European counterparts.  Indeed, far from   18
being lazy the bottom quintile of the American income distribution works far more hours 
than their counterparts in many European countries.  
 
Differences in mobility rates or hours worked do not explain the differences in beliefs.  A 
far better explanation is that beliefs about inequality and its sources reflect the steady 
indoctrination of schools and political leaders.  Left-wing leaders find it in their interest 
to convince people that the poorer beneficiaries from left-wing policies are good people 
sadly beset by forces outside of their control.  Right-wing leaders find it equally in their 
interest to convince people that the poor are cheats and wastrels and that money spent on 
welfare is useless spending on morally deficient individuals.   
 
There is abundant evidence that in schools, speeches, and writing, Americans have 
regularly heard the message that they live in a land of opportunity.  Interestingly, 
Europeans who lived in the right wing regimes of the 19
th century heard the same thing.  
The textbooks of the French Third Republic featured a shoemaker named Gregoire who 
was working his way up the social ladder.  The Kaiser was just as adamant that his 
schools teach people that working hard will lead to success.  The difference between 
American and European indoctrination appeared with the triumph of the European left.  
Already in the 1890s, German teachers’ unions fought with the Kaiser to teach a different 
ideological message.  In the aftermath of the First World War, schools in Europe came to 
steadily spread Marxist messages of class immobility and consciousness.   
 
As such, beliefs about income mobility and inequality reflect indoctrination and the 
political success of the right in the U.S. and the left in Europe, more than they do 
anything about reality.  This final point provides a fitting caution with which to end this 
essay.  Much of the academic discussion of inequality is based more on ideology and 
indoctrination than on reality.  Much of the hostility towards inequality (especially the 
wealth of the very rich) reflects political objectives more than hard academic research 
about actual costs of that inequality.  Likewise, those who argue that using redistribution 
to fight inequality will seriously destroy economic growth, often reflect their political 
preconceptions more than empirical evidence.  Hopefully, future research on inequality   19
will focus more on objective truth and depend less on the ideological orientation of 
different researchers.   
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
Inequality remains a fascinating topic of research.  Across countries, inequality levels 
differ wildly and inequality is correlated with a number of important variables.  
Inequality appears to be determined by the level of development in a non-monotonic 
manner.  Inequality also seems to be the result of ethnic heterogeneity, which impacts 
inequality both directly, since different ethnicities have different skill levels, and 
indirectly through political channels, as people seem less eager to transfer money to 
people from a different ethnic group.  Inequality is correlated with dictatorship and with 
governments that fail to respect property rights.  These correlations at least raise the 
possibility that inequality is actually a causal variable that leads to worse political 
outcomes, but we are far from confident that causality runs from inequality to politics.     
 
The implications of inequality research for public policy are far from clear.   Alesina and 
Rodrik (1994) suggest that inequality deters growth because inequality leads to costly 
redistributionary policies.  Even if this were the right interpretation of the small 
inequality-growth correlation, then it would hardly make sense to try to fight inequality 
with redistribution since, according to this model, redistribution is the problem that 
inequality creates.  The literature on the political economy of inequality does not give 
clear answers on policies, but it does suggest that shifts in inequality may influence 
polities in far-ranging, substantial, and often unpredictable ways.   
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Figure 1: Inequality and Income
Log GDP per capita for 1998

























































Figure 2: Fractionalization and Inequality
Ethnic Fractionalization





























































































































Figure 4: Inequality and Expropriation
Gini Index from World Bank
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